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Some autistic children pass classic Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks that others fail, but the signiﬁcance of this
ﬁnding is at present unclear. We identiﬁed two such groups of primary school age (labelled ToMþ and
ToM) and a matched comparison group of typically developing children (TD). Five years later we tested
these participants again on a ToM test battery appropriate for adolescents and conducted an fMRI study
with a story based ToM task. We also assessed autistic core symptoms at these two time points. At both
times the ToM group showed more severe social communication impairments than the ToMþ group,
and while showing an improvement in mentalizing performance, they continued to show a signiﬁcant
impairment compared to the NT group. Two independent ROI analyses of the BOLD signal showed
activation of the mentalizing network including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and lateral
temporal cortices. Strikingly, both ToMþ and ToM groups showed very similar patterns of heightened
activation in comparison with the NT group. No differences in other brain regions were apparent. Thus,
autistic adolescents who do not have a history of mentalizing problems according to our ToM battery
showed the same atypical neurophysiological response during mentalizing as children who did have
such a history. This ﬁnding indicates that heterogeneity at the behavioural level may nevertheless map
onto a similar phenotype at the neuro-cognitive level.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the most enduring puzzles presented by autism is the
huge difference that may be observed between individuals, while
at the same time there is the compelling impression of similarity
at some level. The impairments in social communication and
interaction, recently reafﬁrmed as critical for a clinical diagnosis
by DSMV, may also be critical to this intuitive impression.
Although the precise nature of the social impairments remains
elusive, the ‘Theory of mind’ or ‘mentalizing’ hypothesis (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Frith, 2012)
represents a systematic attempt to explain both mild and severe
social impairments in autistic individuals. However, there is a
problem for this hypothesis. It has long been known that some
autistic individuals can solve Theory of Mind tasks and others do
not (Happé, 1995; Moran et al., 2011). The question we address
here is whether these are two distinct subgroups or whether both
represent a similar neurocognitive phenotype, at the level of
analysis provided by functional neuroimaging methods. We can
answer the question on the basis of the presence or absence of
atypical brain activation in those autistic children who have a
history of being able to solve Theory of Mind tasks.
The existence of a mentalizing system in the brain is now well
accepted (for reviews see Frith & Frith, 2012; Kennedy & Adolphs,
2012; Lieberman, 2007; Mitchell, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009).
There is also evidence for atypical brain activation in this system in
autistic participants (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Gilbert, Bird,
Brindley, Frith, & Burgess, 2008; Gilbert, Meuwese, Towgood, Frith,
& Burgess, 2009; Gotts et al., 2012; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, &
Colburn, 2012; Lombardo et al., 2010; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011;
Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010). However it is not known whether
such atypical activation is present even in individuals who can
solve Theory of Mind tasks. There may be an underlying impair-
ment which is camouﬂaged at the behavioural level (Frith, 2004).
Camouﬂage may happen when highly verbal individuals have
learned to give accurate answers to Theory of Mind tests using
effortful logical inferences. Thus good mentalizing performance
does not necessarily imply intact intuitive mentalizing ability.
Indeed problems in implicit mentalizing have been revealed in
autistic adults who performed well on explicit mentalizing tasks
(Begeer, Bernstein, van Wijhe, Scheeren, & Koot, 2012; Senju,
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). On the other hand, it is possible
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that a subgroup of autistic individuals have no problems in
understanding intentions and beliefs, or that they can fully over-
come such problems. This should be evident not only at the
behavioural but also the neural level. If so, this would suggest a
distinct neurophysiologically deﬁned phenotype.
To investigate this issue the present study took advantage of an
existing population of autistic as well as neurotypical adolescents
who had been extensively tested in childhood (White, Hill, Happé, &
Frith, 2009). The sample of adolescents who participated in the
present fMRI study were classiﬁed on the basis of their performance
5 years earlier on a large mentalizing test battery: Thus one subgroup
consisted of those who had shown mentalizing performance as good
as that of neurotypical (NT) children (ToMþ), and another group
consisted of those who had shown the more familiar pattern of
mentalizing impairment (ToM). We administered a second menta-
lizing test battery to ﬁnd out to what extent performance changed
over time. We also wanted to establish the validity of the mentalizing
task performance. It would be pointless to classify subgroups on the
performance of tests that were neither reliable over time nor valid in
relation to their real world symptoms. Therefore we investigated
whether ToMþ children had milder core symptoms on diagnostic
tests, both in childhood and in adolescence.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Ethical approval for the study was received from the UCL Research Ethics
Committee and consent was obtained from the parents of all participants prior to
inclusion in the study. The majority of individuals with ASD attended mainstream
schools and all had IQs within the normal range (full scale IQ greater than 85).
The participants were aged 11–17 years. They were a self-selected subset of
those who previously took part in a study by White et al. (2009) at time 1 (T1)
when aged 7–12 years. The original sample included 45 children with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD), diagnosed independently by a qualiﬁed clinician. Of
these, 29 were willing to be involved in the study 5 years later at time 2 (T2), but
7 of these children were either unable to tolerate the scanning environment or
their data were unusable due to movement in the scanner. The ﬁnal sample of 22
adolescents with ASD was split into ToM and ToMþ groups of 11 each. A further
group of 11 typically developing adolescents was also recruited from the original
sample. The three groups were comparable in age (F(2,30)¼1.56, p¼ .23), gender
(χ2(2)¼ .57, p¼ .75), verbal (F(2,30)¼ .90, p¼ .42) and performance IQ (F(2,30)¼
2.44, p¼ .10) (see Table 1).
For the assessment of core symptoms the developmental, dimensional and
diagnostic interview (3Di: Skuse et al., 2004) was used at T1, and the autism
diagnostic observation schedule (ADOS-G: Lord et al., 2000) at T2. The 3Di measure
is similar to the autism diagnostic interview (ADI-R: Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur,
1994) with which it correlates highly (r for each area of the triad of autistic features
ranges from .53 to.64; Skuse et al., 2004).
2.2. T1 ToM battery
This battery included both the ToM Strange Stories and a false belief ToM battery.
The original T1 cohort included 27 NT children (White et al., 2009) and, on the basis
of this larger NT group0s performance, individual variance on both sets of stories was
calculated, independent of age and IQ. This was done by entering raw data from
these 27 NT children as the dependent variable in a regression, with T1 age, verbal,
and performance IQ as predictors, and collecting the residuals. The same regression
equation was then applied to the 22 children with ASD taking part in this study and
all scores were converted to z-scores in relation to the larger NT group0s means and
standard deviations. The average of the ToM Strange Stories and the false belief ToM
battery z-scores was then calculated to provide an overall measure of T1 ToM test
performance for each child. This method was necessary to provide an individual
estimate of ToM ability independent of age and IQ on which the children with ASD
could be divided, so as to avoid the ToM group being populated with younger and
lower-IQ individuals. All participants in the resulting ToM group had T1 ToM z-
scores lower than 2.5 in comparison to the T2 NT group.
2.3. T2 ToM battery
Of the 5 tests given at T2, two had been included in the T1 false belief battery
and found then to be most discriminating between the groups, and three tasks
were new to the participants. The two T1 tasks were 1st order false belief tasks: a
test of real versus apparent emotion (Wellman & Liu, 2004), where a character
wanted to create a false belief in others, and an interpretational false belief task
(different picture to T1; Luckett, Powell, Messer, Thornton, & Schulz, 2002). The
three new tasks were 2nd order false belief tasks: the coat story (Bowler, 1992), a
homework story modelled on the icecream van story (Baron-Cohen, 1989), and a
double bluff burglar story involving 2nd order deception (Happé, 1994). These were
scored out of a total of 10. In all cases, the participant was asked to predict the
knowledge of, behaviour of or emotion felt by another character on the basis of
their mental state; this answer was marked as a pass or fail (1 or 0). The participant
was also asked to justify why they had made that prediction; this was marked as a
correct mental state justiﬁcation (e.g., “because he doesn0t know that she knows
that they0re out of stock”), a correct non-mental state justiﬁcation (e.g., “because
that0s where he had said he was going to go”), or an incorrect justiﬁcation (e.g.,
“because he needed to get a new coat”; 1, 0.5, or 0, respectively). This additional
scoring aimed to check for false positive responses when the participant was
achieving the correct answer by guessing, and also was expected to increase the
variation in responses with the aim of avoiding ceiling effects. Control questions
were administered (memory and reality questions plus prompt questions during
the longer stories), which all individuals were required to pass, to check for
comprehension of the scenario.
2.4. T2 scanner task
Four different types of stories were administered: mental, human, animal and
nature; for the present study only mental (ToM) and nature (non-ToM) were
compared as the human and animal stories have previously been found to rely to a
degree on mentalizing ability (White et al., 2009). The story text and proceeding
question were identical to those given in White et al. (2009) but the participant was
required to select an answer to this question from a choice of three possible
responses. Participants listened to each story, question and response phase
presented binaurally through headphones, as well as simultaneously following
the text visually on a computer screen in order to aid comprehension (see Fig. 1).
The stories were presented during four blocks; each block involved 8 stories,
2 of each type, presented in a pseudorandom order, ensuring that two stories of the
same type were not presented consecutively. Each story–question–response series
lasted 58 s in total; the story phase was presented ﬁrst (taking between 20 and
Table 1
Behavioural data.
NT ToM ToMþ
Background data
N (M:F) 11 (10:1) 11 (9:2) 11 (10:1)
T2 age (years) 14.3 (1.6) 13.8 (1.1) 13.1 (1.9)
T1 WISC III Verbal IQ 118 (16) 110 (16) 111 (14)
T1 WISC III Performance IQ 103 (9) 103 (9) 95 (10)
T1 Clinical diagnosis  3 Autism/6 AS 8 AS
2 ASD 3 ASD
Assessment of core symptoms
T1 3Di social nnn,a 3.4 (2.4) 14.2 (4.6) 10.3 (3.9)
Communication nnn,b 3.5 (2.0) 15.3 (4.3) 13.5 (3.3)
Repetitive behaviour nn,b 2 (.4) 5.4 (2.8) 3.9 (2.9)
T2 ADOS social n,c  7.1 (4.2) 3.5 (2.8)
Communication  3.0 (1.7) 2.0 (.8)
Repetitive behaviour  3.0 (2.2) 1.8 (1.3)
Performance on mentalizing tasks
T1 ToM battery (z-score)nnn,d .0 (1.0) 4.5 (1.4)  .6 (0.8)
T2 ToM battery (z-score)e .0 (1.0) 1.3 (1.4)  .7 (1.3)
T2 scanner ToM Stories (%)nn,c 88 (10) 64 (22) 71 (17)
T2 scanner Non-ToM Stories (%) 85 (12) 75 (24) 77 (16)
Values are given as mean with standard deviation in brackets.
T1¼time 1, T2¼time 2.
ToM¼theory of mind.
NT¼neurotypical; ASD¼autism spectrum disorder; AS¼Asperger syndrome.
3Di¼developmental, dimensional, and diagnostic interview.
ADOS¼autism diagnostic observation schedule.
n po .05.
nn po .01.
nnn po .001.
a ToMaToMþaNT.
b ToM¼ToMþaNT.
c ToMaToMþ .
d ToMaTOMþ¼NT.
e ToMaNT.
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30 s, followed by a 1 s interval), proceeded by the question (taking 8 s) and then
response options (taking between 6 and 11 s for the options to be read out, plus an
additional 8 s), concluding with an interval of variable duration (as the story length
was also variable). Participants selected from the multiple choice options by
pressing keys on a button box with their index, middle and ring ﬁngers on their
right hand.
2.5. Scanning procedure
Participants were familiarised with the tasks during a practice session lasting
approximately 10 min, immediately before the scanning session. A 1.5T Siemens
Avanto system was used to acquire both T1-weighted structural images and T2*-
weighted echoplanar (EPI) images [6464; 3 mm3 mm pixels; echo time (TE),
40 ms] with BOLD contrast. Each volume was comprised of 48 axial slices (3 mm
thick), oriented approximately parallel to the AC–PC plane. Functional scans were
acquired during four sessions, each comprising 156 volumes (lasting 8 min).
Volumes were acquired continuously with an effective repetition time (TR) of 3 s
per volume. The ﬁrst four volumes in each session were discarded to allow for T1
equilibration effects. Following the functional scans, a 6 min T1-weighted structural
scan was performed.
2.6. Data analysis
The fMRI data were analyzed using SPM8 software (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm/software/spm8/). The volumes were realigned, corrected for different slice
acquisition times, normalized into 3 mm cubic voxels using the Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute reference brain and 4th-degree B-spline interpolation, and
smoothed with an isotropic 8-mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
The volumes acquired during the four sessions were treated as separate time
series. For each series, the variance in the BOLD signal was decomposed with a set
of regressors in a general linear model. Separate regressors coded for the story,
question, and response phases of each story, along with an additional regressor to
represent the time of motor response, separately for each of the four story types, to
yield a total of 16 regressors per session. Regressors for the three phases were
generated by convolving a boxcar, corresponding to the duration of each phase,
with a canonical haemodynamic response function. The regressors representing
motor responses (which, unlike the previous three regressors, were not entered
into subsequent statistical analyses) were generated by convolving a delta function
at the time of response production with a canonical haemodynamic response
function. These regressors, together with the regressors representing residual
movement-related artifacts and the mean over scans, comprised the full model
for each session. The data and model were high-pass ﬁltered to a cutoff of 1/128 Hz.
Parameter estimates for each regressor were calculated from the least mean
squares ﬁt of the model to the data. Effects of interest were assessed in random
effects analyses using t-tests on contrast images generated from subject-speciﬁc
analyses. Contrasts were thresholded at Po0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons,
with an extent threshold calculated by SPM8 to yield a family-wise error corrected
probability of po .05.
2.7. Assessment of head motion
In order to examine whether the groups may have differed in head motion, we
calculated a mean framewise displacement (FD) measure, in the manner suggested
by Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, and Petersen (2012), (p. 2144). This yields, for
each participant, a single value indicating mean head displacement from one
volume to the next.
2.8. Functional connectivity analysis
In a further set of analyses we investigated functional connectivity between
four regions of interest (ROIs) deﬁned from the BOLD activation data. We extracted
four timecourses of activation from the preprocessed images, by averaging across
all voxels belonging to each ROI in turn. This was done separately for each session
of each participant0s data, applying a hi-pass ﬁlter identical to the one used for the
BOLD activation analysis. Scans were allocated to separate ToM and non-ToM
datasets when they belonged to one or the other condition, after allowing for a
delay of two TRs (6 s) to account for the rise of the haemodynamic signal. Fisher-
transformed correlation coefﬁcients were then calculated for the correlations
between the signal in each pair of ROIs, separately for the ToM and non-ToM
conditions. These coefﬁcients were then averaged across sessions. In the main
analysis results were averaged across all pairs of ROIs; a follow-up analysis
investigated those pairs of ROIs involving medial prefrontal cortex (i.e. frontal–
posterior connectivity) and the other pairs (i.e. posterior–posterior connectivity)
separately. This provides a simple approach for obtaining a measure of functional
connectivity between a set of predeﬁned ROIs; alternative approaches such as PPI
(Friston et al., 1997) are more appropriate for investigating functional connectivity
between a single seed region and the whole brain volume.
3. Results
3.1. Assessment of core symptoms in childhood and adolescence
Both 3Di and ADOS measures, used at the two different points
in time, indicated milder social impairments in the ToMþ than the
ToM group (3Di: t(20)¼2.13, p¼ .046, d¼ .91; ADOS: t(20)¼2.39,
p¼ .027, d¼1.07). There was a marginally signiﬁcant difference in
communication impairment measured with the ADOS (t(14.1)¼
1.80, p¼ .094, d¼ .77) but not the 3Di (t(20)¼1.13, p¼ .271, d¼ .50).
Repetitive behaviour did not differ signiﬁcantly between groups
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the task administered during fMRI scanning, showing an example ToM story (correct answer: 3) and an example non-ToM story (correct
answer: 1).
S.J. White et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 17–25 19
on either measure (3Di: t(20)¼1.23, p¼ .23, d¼ .55; ADOS: t(20)¼
1.56, p¼ .14, d¼ .70) (see Table 1B and Fig. 2).
In adolescence 8 of the ToMþ and three of the ToM
participants did not obtain a score above the cut-off point for
diagnosis of an ASD on the ADOS; this differentiated the two
groups (χ2¼4.7, p¼ .030). While the proportion of clinically
diagnosed milder or higher-IQ cases that meet ADOS criteria can
lie between 38% and 54% (Baird et al., 2006; Kamp-Becker et al.,
2013), it is consistent with recent studies that suggest that in high
functioning individuals the core symptoms of autism can diminish
over time to the extent that they are no longer detectable (Fein
et al., 2013; Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2012).
Supporting the milder presentation of the ToMþ group, more
children in the ToM group had received autism-speciﬁc pre-
school intervention (8 out of 11) than children in the ToMþ group
(1 out of 11) (χ2¼9.2, p¼ .002). However, the two ASD groups did
not differ signiﬁcantly on age at diagnosis (t(20)¼1.52); the ToMþ
cases were no less likely to have been identiﬁed at a young age.
3.2. Changes in mentalizing test performance from childhood to
adolescence
By deﬁnition when comparing the 3 groups’ performance at T1
on a ToM test battery (F(2,30)¼52.2, po .001, η2¼ .78), the ToM
and ToMþ groups differed hugely (po .001) with the ToM group
performing very poorly indeed, while the NT and ToMþ groups
did not differ (p¼ .206) (see Table 1C and Fig. 3).
At T2, another ToM battery was used, which differentiated the
groups less dramatically than before (F(2,30)¼3.3, p¼ .052, η2¼ .18).
However, the ToM group still performed the mentalizing tasks
signiﬁcantly less accurately than the NT group (p¼ .016). The ToMþ
group performance lay between these two groups, not differing
signiﬁcantly from either (p4 .16).
During fMRI scanning, when participants answered questions
about mental causality (ToM stories) or about physical causality
(non-ToM stories), there was a main effect of Group on accuracy
(F(2,30)¼3.5, p¼ .043, η2¼ .19). Both ASD groups had generally
lower accuracy than NT children across the two story types (ToM
vs NT: F(1,20)¼6.1, p¼ .023, η2¼ .23; ToMþ vs NT: F(1,20)¼5.9,
p¼ .025, η2¼ .23). In the ToM group, this effect was exacerbated
compared to the NT group for stories requiring mentalizing (group
story-type interaction: F(1,20)¼4.3, p¼ .052, η2¼ .18). This effect was
non-signiﬁcant when comparing the ToMþ and NT groups (F(1,20)¼
1.8, p¼ .19, η2¼ .08). Indeed, the ToM group performed worse on
ToM stories than non-ToM stories (F(1,10)¼4.8, p¼ .053, η2¼ .33)
whereas there was no signiﬁcant difference between accuracy on the
two types of story in the ToMþ group (F(1,20)¼1.7, p¼ .22, η2¼ .15).
Thus only the ToM group showed evidence of a mentalizing-
speciﬁc impairment, relative to the NT group. Mean response times
did not differ according to condition or group; nor was there a
signiﬁcant group condition interaction (F(1,30)o1.8, p4 .19,
η2o .08).
Across the different tasks, a correlation was found in the ASD
group as a whole between accuracy in the T1 ToM battery and the
T2 ToM stories (r¼ .48, p¼ .023; vs T2 non-ToM stories r¼ .33,
p¼ .138). This remarkably high correlation between tests adminis-
tered ﬁve years apart indicates the stability of the measures and a
hint of speciﬁcity. This hint of speciﬁcity gains strength from the
partial correlation between T1 ToM battery and T2 ToM stories
(r¼ .38, p¼ .094), controlling for more general story comprehen-
sion (T2 non-ToM stories).
3.3. Brain activation patterns in the mentalizing system in
adolescence
We used a region of interest (ROI) approach to compare the
three groups. First, we deﬁned the mentalizing network by
performing a contrast of ToM versus non-ToM stories, collapsing
over the three groups and the three story phases (presentation of
the story, the question, and the response options). This revealed
four regions of activation using a whole-brain family-wise-error-
corrected threshold: medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate,
and bilaterally the temporo-parietal junction/temporal poles
(Table 2; Fig. 4A). Mean signal across all voxels was then extracted
Fig. 2. Assessment of core symptoms. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Fig. 3. Performance on mentalizing tasks. Error bars indicate standard error of
the mean.
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for the ToM versus non-ToM contrast in each of the four ROIs and
each of the three story phases for each participant. These data
were used for direct comparisons between groups.
The hypothesis testing data were independent of the data used to
deﬁne the ROIs, under the null hypothesis (Kriegeskorte, Simmons,
Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). This was possible because the group
comparisons involved orthogonal contrasts to the ones used to deﬁne
the ROIs, and furthermore, we used a balanced design with equal
numbers of participants in each of the three groups. This unbiased
approach maximises our statistical power to detect group differences
within the mentalizing network: Comparisons were performed within
a limited number of orthogonally-deﬁned regions of interest rather
than requiring exploratory whole-brain-corrected analyses.
A 3 (group)3 (story phase)4 (ROI) ANOVA showed a main
effect of group (F(2,30)¼3.8, p¼ .034, η2¼ .20), which did not
interact with any other factor (p4 .37). Note that the BOLD data
entered into this analysis is already a subtraction between the
two conditions, so this is equivalent to a group condition inter-
action. Follow-up tests revealed that both the ToMþ (F(1,20)¼5.3,
p¼ .033, η2¼ .21) and the ToM (F(1,20)¼5.4, p¼ .030, η2¼ .21)
groups showed signiﬁcantly greater mentalizing-related BOLD
signal change than the NT group, but there was no difference
between the two ASD groups (F(1,20)¼ .02, p¼ .89, η2¼ .001)
(see Fig. 4B). A whole-brain analysis comparing the ToM and
ToMþ groups failed to reveal any regions of signiﬁcant signal
change. To illustrate mentalizing-related signal change in each of
the three groups, unthresholded statistical maps for the ToM
versus non-ToM comparison are presented in Fig. 5.
To summarize, the brain activation patterns in the mentalizing
system were remarkably similar for the ToMþ and ToM groups
and differed from the NT group. However these results have to be
considered in the light of some particular limitations of our study,
namely the small sample size imposed by the longitudinal design.
Table 2
Regions showing signiﬁcantly greater activity for the ToM than the non-ToM
stories, collapsed across all 3 groups (BA¼Brodmann area).
Region BA Co-ordinate Zmax N voxels
Medial prefrontal cortex 9/10 12, 56, 31 4.20 173
Posterior cingulate cortex 23 3, 55, 31 4.74 155
Left lateral temporal cortex 21/22/38 45, 37, 4 5.51 400
Right lateral temporal cortex 21/22/38 57, 25, 2 4.97 519
Fig. 4. Mentalizing network and signal change relating to mentalizing. Panel A: Four regions comprising the mentalizing network, illustrated on a sagittal slice of the mean
structural image (x¼0) and SPM8 renderings on the right and left lateral surfaces. Panel B: Mean signal change, collapsed across the four regions and three story phases, in
each of the three groups. Panel C: Mean signal change in each of the four regions of interest. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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4. Follow-up analyses of fMRI results
4.1. Effects of head motion
Analysis of the mean framewise displacement measure (FD;
Power et al., 2012) showed that, compared with the TD group
(FD:.13), there was a marginally signiﬁcant increase in head
motion in the ToMþ group (FD:.25, t(10.8)¼1.91, p¼ .08, d¼ .85)
and a nonsigniﬁcant increase in the ToM group (FD:.26, t(10.6)¼
1.64, p¼ .13, d¼ .73). The ToMþ and ToM groups did not differ
(t(20)¼ .06, p¼ .95, d¼ .03). FD did not correlate signiﬁcantly with
mentalizing-related BOLD signal change in any of the three groups
considered individually (ToM: r¼ .29, p¼ .39; ToMþ: r¼ .10,
p¼ .77; TD: r¼ .46, p¼ .15), nor across the whole sample (r¼
.24, p¼ .18). Thus, although there was limited evidence for
increased head motion in the ToM groups compared with TD
participants, this did not relate to mentalizing-related BOLD signal
change.
4.2. Consistency of results using ROIs derived from an independent
study
The foregoing analysis deﬁned ROIs by collapsing across all
participants. However it should be noted that the majority of
participants in our sample belonged to one of the two ASD groups.
Consequently it is uncertain whether results would have been
similar if the mentalizing network had been deﬁned from neuro-
typical participants only. In order to address this issue we
conducted an additional analysis using ROIs deﬁned from a prior
independent study. We based these ROIs on data reported by
Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, and Blakemore (2009), seeing as their
study investigated brain activity elicited by representation of
mental states in (neurotypical) adolescent participants, using
verbal stories as stimuli. Thus their study was similar to ours both
in terms of participant demographics and stimulus materials.
In their adolescent group, Burnett et al. report four regions of
activation: medial prefrontal cortex (10, 52, 18); precuneus/
posterior cingulate (4, 56, 28), left temporal cortex (38,
66, 42) and right temporal cortex (44, 48, 28). For each of
these four regions, we deﬁned ROIs using a 10 mm radius sphere
centered on the peak co-ordinate. Collapsing across our three
groups, BOLD signal was signiﬁcantly greater for ToM than non-
ToM stories in three of the four ROIs (F(1,30)49.9; po .004;
η24 .24); however, the left temporal ROI did not show any
signiﬁcant signal change, either collapsed across the three groups
(F(1,30)¼ .02; p¼ .90; η2o .01), or in any of the three groups
individually (F(1,30)o1.5; p4 .26; η2o .13). Consequently, this
ROI was dropped from further analysis. The three ROIs that did
respond to the ToM versus non-ToM contrast were examined in a 3
(Group)3 (Phase)×3 (ROI) ANOVA, as in the earlier analysis. This
showed a marginally signiﬁcant effect of Group (F(2,30)¼2.9;
p¼ .07; η2¼ .16). Follow-up tests showed that both the ToM
group (F(1,20)¼3.1; p¼ .09; η2¼ .13) and the ToMþ group (F
(1,20)¼5.2; p¼ .03; η2¼ .21) showed elevated BOLD signal, in
comparison with the TD group. The two ASD groups did not differ
from each other (F(1,20)¼ .48; p¼ .50; η2¼ .02). None of these
effects differed between regions (p4 .5). Thus, results were simi-
lar, even when ROIs were deﬁned from an independent study of
neurotypical participants.
4.3. Did participants with ASD show an elevated BOLD signal across
all contrasts?
Our fMRI results might be explained by some factor that leads
to a globally elevated BOLD signal in participants with ASD, for
example due to physiological reasons, regardless of the contrast or
the brain regions examined. However, further analysis showed
that this was not the case. An identical analysis to the foregoing
analysis of ToM versus non-ToM stories was conducted. However,
for this analysis the contrast of non-mentalizing stories versus rest
(i.e. the inter-trial interval) was investigated; in all other respects
the analysis was identical to the one presented in Fig. 4. There
were four regions of activation, collapsed across the three groups:
(1) bilateral occipital cortex (peak: 24, 97, 1; Zmax¼6.78; 394
voxels); (2) right lateral temporal cortex (peak: 51, 31, 2;
Zmax¼5.52; 584 voxels); (3) left lateral temporal cortex (peak:
63, 4, 5; Zmax¼6.87; 355 voxels); (4) right posterior frontal
cortex (peak: 39, 5, 49; Zmax¼4.01; 82 voxels). Results were
Fig. 5. Unthresholded statistical parametric maps, in each of the groups, showing signal change associated with mentalizing. The white outlines indicate regions of interest,
which were deﬁned by comparing ToM vs non-ToM stories collapsed across the three groups. Results are illustrated on sagittal (x¼0) and axial (z¼0) slices of the mean
structural scan.
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analysed as above in a 3 (group)3 (story phase)4 (ROI)
ANOVA. In contrast to the mentalizing-related analysis, this
analysis revealed no signiﬁcant effect of group (mean parameter
estimates: NT¼ .50, SE¼ .10; ToM¼ .60, SE¼ .10; ToMþ¼ .35,
SE¼ .09; F(2,30)¼1.7, p¼ .20, η2¼ .10). Thus it was not the case
that signal change was elevated in the two autism groups across
all statistical contrasts, as might be expected if the results shown
in Fig. 4 resulted from a global factor that differed between groups.
4.4. Was there sufﬁcient power to detect differences between ToMþ
and ToM groups?
Calculation of effect sizes (Cohen0s d) indicated large effects
when comparing BOLD signal change in each of the ASD groups
with the NT group (ToM: d¼1.04; ToMþ: d¼1.03). By contrast,
the comparison of ToMþ versus ToM yielded a d of just 0.06.
There were also large behavioural differences between the ToMþ
and ToM groups in the ADOS and 3Di social scales (d¼1.01 and
0.91, respectively). Power calculations (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) indicate that had there been correspondingly large
effects in the BOLD signal comparison between ToMþ and ToM ,
our study would have power ranging from 66 to 78% to detect at
least a marginally signiﬁcant effect, whereas there was in fact no
hint of an effect (p¼ .89). However, it should be noted that post-
hoc power analyses of this type are likely to inﬂate effect sizes
(Button et al., 2013).
4.5. Would a Bayesian analysis give similar results?
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009) suggest an
alternative approach for determining whether a dataset can be
considered to provide positive support in favour of, or against, a
null hypothesis, by calculating Bayes Factors (Kass & Raftery, 1995).
Applying the JZS Bayes Factor method suggested by Rouder et al. to
our ToMþ versus ToM BOLD comparison (with default scale
factor 1.0) yields a Bayes Factor of 3.3, i.e. positive support for the
null hypothesis, where a factor in excess of 3.2 is conventionally
considered to provide “substantial” evidence (Kass & Raftery,
1995).
4.6. Were there differences in functional connectivity between
groups?
In a ﬁnal analysis we considered whether the groups may have
differed in functional connectivity between the four ROIs, even in
the absence of overall signal change differences. Functional con-
nectivity was calculated in each group, separately for the ToM and
non-ToM stories, averaged across each pair of ROIs. Connectivity
was signiﬁcantly greater during ToM than non-ToM stories (F
(1,30)¼8.3, p¼ .007, η2¼ .22). However, there was no main effect
of group nor group condition interaction (F(2,30)o .95, p4 .39,
η2o .06). The measures of functional connectivity did not correlate
signiﬁcantly with head motion (i.e. mean framewise displace-
ment), either within each group separately or across the whole
sample (|r|o .57; p4 .069). These results are shown in Table 3.
Similar results held even when investigating frontal-posterior or
posterior-posterior connectivity alone (effect of condition: F(1,30)
45.4; po .03; η24 .15; effect of group/group condition interac-
tion: F(2,30)o2.4; p4 .11; η2o .14). Thus, although our measure
was sensitive enough to detect an enhancement of functional
connectivity during ToM versus non-ToM stories, this measure did
not distinguish the three groups.
5. Discussion
All the individuals in our sample had been clinically diagnosed
as autistic in early childhood. When they were ﬁrst tested with
mentalizing tasks they were between 7 and 12 years old. Their
performance on these tasks varied enormously and allowed us to
divide them into two groups (ToMþ and ToM). The differences
between the groups, who were of similar IQ and socioeconomic
background, were reﬂected in differences in symptom severity.
Thus, poor mentalizing performance was associated with a more
severe pattern of social and communication behaviours. This was
the case in childhood, when parents were interviewed, and was
still the case in adolescence when the participants were assessed
in the lab through observation with the ADOS. The relationship
with different assessment instruments at different points in time
are in line with the idea that mentalizing difﬁculties underlie both
performance on speciﬁc tests and core symptoms that the diag-
nostic instruments address.
Our longitudinal design allows us to say something about the
persistence of mentalizing difﬁculties over time, at least for the
ToM group. Here it is likely that even early in life more severe
difﬁculties were evident, since there was greater use of preschool
intervention than in the ToMþ group. Nevertheless, mentalizing
test performance improved markedly from childhood to adoles-
cence. Despite this improvement, which brought the ToM group
more in line with the ToMþ group, they remained signiﬁcantly
impaired relative to the NT group. Furthermore, at the neurophy-
siological level both autistic groups showed equally atypical
activation. We found as clear an answer as possible to the question
of whether the ToMþ group did or did not differ from the ToM
group at the level of neurophysiology at adolescence: ToMþ and
ToM groups showed similarly atypical BOLD responses in the
mentalizing system and both differed from the NT group. We
therefore suggest that there is a neurophysiological abnormality
that persists despite improvements over time, despite individual
differences in performance, and is present even in mildly impaired
ASD adolescents.
Both ASD groups showed greater activation of the mentalizing
network than NT participants. This is consistent with other recent
studies showing over-activation of mentalizing-related brain
regions in ASD, both in mentalizing (Gilbert et al., 2009; Mason,
Williams, Kana, Minshew, & Just, 2008) and non-mentalizing
(Dichter, Felder, & Bodﬁsh, 2009; Gilbert et al., 2008) tasks.
However, other previous studies have reported under-activation
of the mentalizing network (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002;
Happé et al., 1996; Kana et al., 2012; Lombardo, Chakrabarti,
Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; Silani et al., 2008; Wang, Lee,
Sigman, & Dapretto, 2007) or no differences (Dufour et al., 2013).
Thus, it appears that atypical mentalizing-related brain activity in
ASD can take the form of both under- and over-activation, likely as
a result of task-speciﬁc factors (Koster-Hale, Saxe, Dungan, &
Young, 2013). Koster-Hale et al. (2013) suggest that one task-
speciﬁc factor potentially inﬂuencing under- versus over-
activation is the use of implicit versus explicit tasks. In an implicit
task, where participants are not explicitly instructed to engage
mentalizing processes, it is possible that participants with ASD fail
Table 3
Functional connectivity within the mentalizing network (mean Fisher-transformed
correlation coefﬁcient) in each group.
Mean (SD)
NT ToM ToMþ
Non-ToM stories .527 (.107) .570 (.179) .567 (.190)
ToM stories .646 (.206) .637 (.132) .601 (.168)
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to engage these processes and therefore underactivate the menta-
lizing network. An example of this type of task might be the
animations task used by Castelli et al. (2002), where participants
are asked to describe the movement of animated shapes. Neuro-
typical individuals typically interpret such animations using
mental-state concepts more appropriately than autistic partici-
pants (White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011). In Castelli et al.0s
(2002) study autistic participants under-activated the mentalizing
system. By contrast, in explicit tasks, participants with autism may
expend more effort to compensate for mentalizing difﬁculties,
hence over-activating the mentalizing network. The present study
would be an example of an explicit task: the mentalizing stories
are followed by the explicit question to explain a character0s
behaviour in terms of mental state attribution.
A second (but related) interpretation derives from considera-
tion of capacity limits in mentalizing. When mentalizing demands
are low, it is possible that autistic participants will engage
mentalizing processes to a greater degree than neurotypicals in
an attempt to compensate for their difﬁculties with the task.
(Whether this compensatory activation actually improves perfor-
mance is another matter). By contrast, for very highly demanding
tasks that exceed capacity limitations, autistic participants may no
longer engage in mentalizing at all, leading to reduced BOLD signal
compared with neurotypicals. Thus it should not necessarily be
surprising if abnormalities of the mentalizing system in autism
reveal themselves as increased activation in some studies and
decreased activation in others.
A third possible explanation of our ﬁnding of enhanced
mentalizing-related activation in ASD is that we studied adoles-
cent participants, in contrast to the adult samples more prevalent
in previous research. Studies of typically developing adolescents
have revealed increased MPFC activation compared with adult
participants (Blakemore, 2008). If mentalizing development is
substantially delayed in autism (Happé, 1995), this delay may be
recapitulated in neural response, leading to increases rather than
decreases in mentalizing-related brain activity during adolescence,
or no difference (see Uddin, Supekar, & Menon, 2013, for a similar
argument in relation to the effect of development on atypical
functional connectivity).
We are aware of the limitations of our study, in particular, the
power to detect modest effect sizes. However, large effects,
sufﬁcient to yield signiﬁcant results, were obtained when compar-
ing the ToMþ and ToM groups on two measures of social
impairment, as well as when comparing BOLD signal change in
each group against the NT group. This indicates that the mentaliz-
ing battery used at T1 to separate the two groups of ASD
participants was sufﬁciently reliable to yield signiﬁcant differences
even at T2. The absence of any signiﬁcant BOLD signal differences
between ToMþ and ToM groups cannot therefore be considered
inevitable given our sample size. Power analyses suggested that
the power of our study, while far from ideal, was not negligible.
Furthermore, a Bayesian analysis suggested positive evidence in
favour of the null hypothesis when comparing BOLD signal in the
two groups, rather than merely an inability to exclude it. Thus,
we contend that the present null result is noteworthy, albeit
preliminary.
Our study cannot tell us what caused the better social adapta-
tion of the ToMþ group. At this point we have no ROIs outside the
standard mentalizing network to guide the search for a physiolo-
gical difference that might support improved social abilities. What
led this group towards better compensatory learning will have to
be addressed by future research. We suggest that future studies
use both implicit and explicit measures of mentalizing ability,
using techniques such as eye gaze tracking. We also note that
larger group sizes would allow more sensitive investigations of
brain regions outside the mentalizing network. Furthermore,
alternative analytic techniques such as multivariate approaches
(e.g. Gilbert et al., 2009) might shed light on individual differences
in mentalizing ability and the severity of core symptoms. Our
analysis of functional connectivity did not yield any signiﬁcant
group effects, and recent studies have produced mixed results
(Müller et al., 2011; Tyszka, Kennedy, Paul, & Adolphs, 2013).
Nevertheless, this approach should also be considered.
We are cautiously optimistic that despite the observed hetero-
geneity in autism, there is a similar neurocognitive impairment
that underlies the core symptoms. Thus, mentalizing-related
anomalies in brain function may map onto a consistent phenotype
that underlies impairments in reciprocal social communication.
This lends credence to clinical intuition that a speciﬁc impairment
can unite very heterogeneous cases, hitherto not captured by
diagnostic, behavioural or biological measures. If conﬁrmed in
future studies, a neuro-cognitive phenotype associated with men-
talizing impairment may be useful for elucidating the genetic and
neurobiological mechanisms behind autism by uniting otherwise
seemingly heterogeneous cases.
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